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Cake day: June 14th, 2023

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  • I’ve had to hard reset my controllers (both Zwave and Zigbee) a few times now, haven’t really found a cause but it’s usually been around times when updates were applied. It almost seemed to me like the device wasn’t released by the old container and that needed a hard disconnect to force it. IIRC logs just showed a generic can’t connect to device error but no sign of what had the device locked. First time I did some investigation, the few times it’s happened since then I just unplugged and reconnected the usb device, restarted the container and it worked after.

    I haven’t had it happen for a while at least.










  • I think it’s not quite as well known or prevalent as other services (as say SSH) so likely doesn’t have anything automated attacking it yet. If you check something like http://shodan.io/ against your ip, I’d guess the service has been found.

    Home Assistant likely won’t come under any kind of attack until there’s a very easy to exploit, unpatched zero-day vulnerability in the wild. Given how many people (myself included) who have HA exposed publicly it’s really a matter of time. The best mitigation is not exposing publicly if possible, and staying up to date.

    In my case I don’t expose HA over 8123, I have a proxy on 443 where HA is not the default host name, meaning if you don’t use the right host HA doesn’t receive the traffic. As I’d expect that automated attackers wouldn’t what my host is it’s a reasonable layer in the security onion. I don’t expect anything would realistically protect from a targeted attack but I’m also not important enough to be targeted.


  • You don’t need cards to have full bandwidth, they only time it will matter is when you’re loading the models on the card. You need a motherboard with x16 slots but even x4 connections would be good enough. Running the model doesn’t need a lot of bandwidth. Remember you only load the model once then reuse it.

    An x4 pcie gen 4 slot has ~7.8 GiB/s theoretical transfer rate (after overhead), a x16 has ~31.5GiB/s - so disk I/O is likely your limit even for a x4 slot.

    • overhead was already in calculations

  • We can’t ever stop this kind of stuff, but with something like fail2ban you can set it up to block on too many failures.

    Really though - ensuring your system is kept up to date and uses strong passwords or use a SSH keys is the best defence. Blocking doesn’t prevent them from trying a few times. Moving SSH to a non standard port will stop most of the automated attacks but it won’t stop someone who is dedicated.




  • Without looking at it it’s probably making a unique request to a resource on a NextDNS subdomain and watching where the request comes from. Like pulling an image from (unique _string).check.nextdns.com. This requires nothing special on the client, it’s making a standard request, and as part of that it needs to do a DNS lookup.

    If the source of the and your IP are similar then it’s likely the same network, otherwise it can correlate the source with known resolvers.


  • BTRFS has RAID built into the file system - instead of using MD you use BTRFS profiles which tell the system how to handle data.

    For instance

    • file system data (critical for the file system to function): raid1c3 which means 3 copies of core P file system data on 3 different devices
    • user data: raid1 (so duplicating all your data on two different devices)

    With this set up you could lose one device (of n, the total doesn’t matter), and not lose any data, and still be able to boot to recover with too much hassle.

    BTRFS does block checksums, can scan for bit rot and recover from it, and generally tries to make your data safe. It technically supports raid5/6 for user data, the issue is around unclean shutdowns and a potential write hole where you could lose data, but if your system has a UPS backup and is on a relatively recent kernel it’s not any more dangerous than MD raid5/6 as I understand it.